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THE PRIMARY FILING FEE: REASONABLE
REGULATION OR EQUAL PROTECTION
VIOLATION?
At present many states impose a filing fee on the primary elec-
tion candidate as a condition to accepting his declaration of candi-
dacy and placing his name on the primary ballot.1 Such a fee is
sustained as a reasonable exercise of the state's power to regulate
and control the conduct of the electoral process.' The two main
arguments advanced in support of the reasonableness of a filing fee
are: First, those who seek the benefit of a particular proceeding
provided by the law should reimburse the state for a portion of the
expense incurred in carrying that proceeding into effect.' Second,
the fee provides an orderly and systematic method of selecting bona
fide candidates,4 thus tending "to prevent an indiscriminate scramble
for office," 5 on the assumption "that any candidate who is of suffi-
cient worth to stand before the people as a candidate ...will be
at no difficulty to pay the required amount."6 By design the fee
supposedly excludes those aspirants who do not have the public
interest in mind; presumably they would receive insignificant sup-
port at the polls.7 Impliedly, the affluent candidate is more public-
spirited than the poor.
This comment will analyze both state and federal constitutional
objections to the imposition of the filing fee as a valid exercise of the
state'p power to regulate elections, utilizing California law as an
example.' While recent election cases emphasize equal protection of
1 See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6552 (West Supp. 1967); MINN. STATS. § 202.05
(West Supp. 1967); REV. CODE WASH. § 29.18.050 (West 1965).
2 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (1909); accord, State ex rel.
Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 P. 728 (1908) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Scott, 99
Minn. 145, 108 N.W. 829 (1906).
3 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (1909) ; see Lasseigne v. Martin,
202 So. 2d 250 (La. Ct. App. 1967), appeal dismissed, 250 La. 1081, 202 So. 2d 257
(1967) ; see also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 864, 869 (1963).
4 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 790, 103 P. 181, 187 (1909) ; cf. Gray v.
Kenny, 67 Cal. App. 2d 282, 153 P.2d 961 (1944); see also 89 A.L.R.2d 864, 872
(1963).
5 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 790, 103 P. 181, 187 (1909).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Other states which require a primary filing fee of prospective candidates are:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, and Washington.
The following states use the petition method instead of the fee requirement:
Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont.
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the laws,9 the early cases turned on the reasonableness of the legisla-
tion.
THE REASONABLENESS TEST: SOME ANCIENT PRECEDENTS
After California adopted an enabling amendment to the con-
stitution,' ° the legislature in 1909 enacted a comprehensive direct
primary law" similar to the provisions in the present Elections
Code. 2 That same year the historic test case of Socialist Party v.
Uhl 3 challenged the constitutionality of that law. In a blanket at-
tack plaintiff wove in the argument that the imposition of a filing fee,
as a condition to placing a candidate's name on the primary ballot,
was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's regulatory power over
elections. Opponents of the direct primary law also contended that
the fee violated Article I, section twenty-four of the California Con-
stitution which prohibits property qualifications as a requirement for
any person to either vote or hold office.' 4 Upholding the state's
power to exact the fee, the court said it was justified as a reasonable
regulation to promote the proper functioning of the primary."
Aside from the reimbursement syllogism 16 the court was particu-
Four states give the candidate a choice, either file a petition or a fee: Kansas,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Oregon.
9 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963).
10 "[Tlhe Legislature shall enact laws providing for the direct nomination of
candidates for public office, by electors, political parties, or organizations of electors
without conventions, at elections to be known and designated as primary elections;
also to determine the tests and conditions upon which electors ...may participate
in any such primary election." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 21/2 (1908).
11 Act of March 24, 1909, ch. 405, [1909] Cal. Stats. 691.
12 CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6400-6800 (West 1961), as amended, (West Supp. 1967).
In the Direct Primary Law of 1909, the filing fee was established as a flat rate fee for
federal and certain state offices. Act of March 24, 1909, ch. 405, § 7, [1909] Cal. Stats.
696. The Legislature amended this section in 1927 providing for percentage fees
based on the first year's salary for candidates for federal and state-wide offices. Act
of July 31, 1927, ch. 838, § 7, [1927] Cal. Stats. 1694. Fees for the offices of state
senator and assemblyman were placed on the percentage scale in 1963. CAL. ELc.
CODE § 6552 (West 1961), as amended, ch. 693, § 3, [1963] Cal. Stats. 1701, and ch.
1305, § 1, [1963] Cal. Stats. 2831.
13 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (1909). Since this was an overall attack, the court
was primarily interested in considering the validity of the act as a whole, and only
secondarily concerned with the specific thrust against the filing fee. In expressing its
concern for the effectiveness of the entire act, the court commented that even if the
provision relating to the fee conflicted with the state constitution, it would not in-
validate the entire act. If eliminated, the remainder of the act providing a general
scheme for the conduct of primary elections could stand. Id. at 789, 181 P. at 186-87.
14 "No property qualification shall ever be required for any person to vote or
hold office." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
15 The court relied on the enabling amendment which gave the legislature the
power to implement the Primary Act by providing reasonable conditions for the ex-
ercise of the rights granted by that act. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2%.
16 See p. 169 supra.
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larly persuaded by the argument that the legislative intent was to
create an orderly and systematic method by which the people might
effectively register their choice for public office. To effect this intent
the court sustained the fee as preventing a wholesale filing of nomina-
tion declarations which would disrupt the primary.1 7 Since this is
a legitimate concern of the legislature, its intent is not questioned.' 8
The effective means to that end, nevertheless, should be closely
scrutinized.' 9 The court indicated that the fee would be a reasonable
regulation if it imposed no hardship on a person for whom there
was minimal electorate support, but prevented a filing en masse by
undesirable candidates.2" The obvious difficulties with this position
are the determination of the amount of the fee,2 ' and the judgment
of the candidate's good faith. The latter is a decision better left to
the voter except in cases where there is a clear attempt to upset the
electoral process.22
The court recognized that similar cases arose in several other
jurisdictions although decisions contrary to its own were rendered in
those states.23 As a general rule the filing fee could be sustained as
compensation for services rendered if reasonably related to the value
of those services.24 In distinguishing the North Dakota and Neb-
raska cases, the Uhl court noted that the relevant statutes in those
17 See note 4 supra.
18 The federal constitution grants to the state legislatures the authority to regulate
elections within congressional limitations. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4. See p. 173 infra.
19 See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
20 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 790, 103 P. 181, 187 (1909).
21 State ex rel. Riggle v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 492, -, 143 P. 238, 242 (1914)
(dissenting opinion); see Ballinger v. McLaughlin, 225 S.D. 206, -, 116 N.W. 70,
71 (1908) ; Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N.D. 363, -, 113 N.W. 1071, 1074
(1907).
22 A pertinent section of the Kentucky Statutes reads in part: "No person shall
file a notification and declaration to become a candidate in a primary election as a
pretended, fictitious or 'dummy' candidate for the purpose of influencing or controlling
the selection of challengers or inspectors or officers of election .... " KY. REV. STATS.,
ch. 119, § 119.060 (1963).
A provision of the Oklahoma Elections Laws requires that at the time of filing a
petition to have his name placed on the primary ballot, a candidate shall deposit two
hundred fifty dollars with the State Election Board. This deposit is to be used to
defray any expenses of a hearing concerning challenges to the individual's candidacy.
If successful in defense, and his name is placed on the ballot without further objection,
the deposit is returned. OKLA. ELEC. LAWS, ch. 5, § 165a (Supp. 1968).
23 Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N.D. 363, 113 N.W. 1071 (1907); People
ex rel. Breckon v. Election Comm'rs, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N.E. 321 (1906) ; State ex rel. Adair
v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N.W. 174 (1905) ; see also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 864 (1963).
24 The expenses of the primary are paid out of the public treasuries. CAL. ELEC.
CODE § 10000 (West 1961). There is no question, therefore, of the power of the legis-
lature to require those submitting their names to be voted for at the primary to pay
the expenses of the election.
The actual services referred to are those rendered in the filing of the nomination
papers. Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 789-90, 103 P. 181, 187 (1909).
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jurisdictions had based determination of the fee "on the emoluments
of the office to which the candidate aspires . . . ." Since there was
no reasonable relation between the fee and the services rendered the
decision went against the state in those instances. Uhl, however,
relied upon State ex rel. Thompson v. Scott,2" wherein the Supreme
Court of Minnesota admitted that the flat rate fee was not intended
to have any appreciable relation to the amount of income from the
office."
Yet Uhl seems to imply that a fee based on a percentage of
salary is prima facie unreasonable because it is determined directly
by the remuneration of the office and not the cost of the services
which are rendered.28 Had the present fee scale been integrated into
the Direct Primary Act of 1909, it seems that the court might have
struck it down as not being directly related to the cost of the services
performed, that is, based on the arbitrary and irrelevant standard
of lucrativeness of the office."
Besides justifying the fee as a proper revenue measure when
designed as a reasonable reimbursement for services, the Uhl court
also sustained it on the regulation theory.30 The goal was to preclude
political imposters from using the primaries for purposes other than
those for which they were devised." The supporting logic was that
any candidate of sufficient integrity to run for representative office
would have no difficulty paying the required filing fee. 2 This as-
sumption, though couched in euphemistic terms, is the equivalent
of stating that a citizen's worth as an aspiring candidate is measured
by his ability to meet a pecuniary standard in order to qualify for
candidacy. Such a criterion is neither contemplated nor permitted
by the California Constitution.33 Such reasoning is also repugnant
to federal constitutional policy.34
Underlying the argument that the fee requirement prevents an
25 Id. at 790-91, 103 P. at 187. In Johnson the fee was set at two percent of the
annual salary of the office sought. Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N.D. 363, -,
113 N.W. 1071, 1071 (1907). In Drexel it was one percent. State ex rel. Adair v.
Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, -, 105 N.W. 174, 178 (1905).
26 99 Minn. 145, 108 N.W. 829 (1906).
27 Id. at - , 108 N.W. at 830.
28 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (1909) (by implication).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 790, 103 P. at 187.
31 The purpose of a primary election law is to preserve the integrity of parties
by restricting the right to participate in the primary of a given party, either as a
candidate or an elector, to persons who are committed to the principles of that
party, sympathetic with its aims, and loyal to its tenets. Id. at 792-93, 103 P. at 188.
32 Id. at 790, 103 P. at 187.
33 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
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"indiscriminate scramble" is the premise that the number of candi-
dates should be limited and restrained. Johnson v. Grand Forks
County35 reasoned against Uhl on this point. Johnson saw the spirit
of the election system as encouraging free choice; the greater the
number of aspirants, the more varied the choice.36
The reason for regulating the primary is to maintain an orderly
elective system. 7 The purpose of preserving the system should be
to enable citizens to intelligently participate not only as voters ex-
pressing their choices for representatives, 3 but also as candidates
carrying out the mandate of their supporters. State regulatory
methods must be in accord with this purpose. By adopting means
which have no relevance to an intelligent participation in the elective
process, in order to effectuate that process, the state legislates idly
since the law defeats its very purpose.
39
A CANDIDATE'S RIGHT: EQUAL PROTECTION
Federal constitutional limitations govern any preliminary elec-
tion that in fact determines the true weight a vote will have.4 Since
a California primary election is an integral part of the full elective
process, 4' it follows that when a state regulation of a primary election
denies to any elector within its borders the equal protection of its
laws, that elector has standing to seek relief under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.42 But in order to guaran-
tee the candidate equal protection, the elector's right to be a candi-
date must first be established.
While the United States Constitution established an elector's
35 16 N.D. 363, 113 N.W. 1071 (1907).
36 Id. at -, 113 N.W. at 1074. Quoting J. WiosoRE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT
SYSTEm 54 (1889), the court stated: "'But it is to be remembered that in this country
a candidacy may be hopeless as regards the election of the nominee, and yet impor-
tant and highly desirable as a means of exhibiting the strength of a section of
electors or of a particular movement, and, of course, compelling the attention of the
leading parties, and the modification of their platforms and legislative policies. It will
be seen, therefore, that the plan of requiring a reasonable deposit is not adapted to
our political methods, and that its adoption would be ill advised.' " Id. at -, 113
N.W. at 1074-75.
37 Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 792, 103 P. 181, 188 (1909).
38 Id.
39 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); cf. Spier v.
Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 P. 659 (1898).
40 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); accord, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944).
41 Barber v. Blue, 65 Cal. 2d 185, 417 P.2d 401 (1966); accord, Donnellan v.
Hite, 139 Cal. App. 2d 43, 293 P.2d 158 (1956) ; In re McGee, 36 Cal. 2d 592, 226
P.2d 1 (1951).
42 Williams v. Rhodes, 89 S. Ct. 5, 10 (1968); see Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596,
601, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (1966).
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right to be a candidate for United States Senator and member of the
House of Representatives, 3 nowhere does it provide for his right to
be a candidate for state office.44 In 1944 the Supreme Court held that
both the right to vote and the right to candidacy in state elections
were privileges of state citizenship, rather than national citizenship,
and thus were not protected by the privileges and immunities
clause.45 This holding, however, has already been overruled with
respect to the voter's right.46 To acknowledge a right to vote without
a right to run seems somewhat illogical.
In a representative form of government the people express
their sovereignty through the ballot. If preservation of the people's
sovereignty measures the viability of representative government,
then the elective franchise is obviously the most valuable right of
citizenship.4 7 To treasure the right to vote without securing the
right to candidacy seems self-defeating. The touchstone of the vot-
ing right is free choice. 48 To the extent that choice is limited, the
voting right is diminished. Thus, restricting the number of candi-
dates reduces the voting right. It follows that the right to vote
necessarily implies the right to candidacy.
However, in discussing the applicability of the equal protection
clause it is unnecessary to pinpoint the source of the right in ques-
tion.49 It is enough to say that once the right is granted to the elec-
torate, lines which are discriminatory may not be drawn.50 Accord-
ingly, the right of candidacy is subject only to the imposition
43 U.S. CowsT. art. I, § 2; see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15
(1941).
44 But belief in the right to candidacy is not a novelty in constitutional law. As
early as 1902 Chief Justice Beatty of the California Supreme Court said: "The right
to be chosen to a public office is as much a constitutional right as the right of suffrage,
and to deprive any person possessing the constitutional qualifications for office of the
opportunity of competing with other candidates upon equal terms is a denial of his
constitutional rights." Murphy v. Curry, 137 Cal. 479, 486, 70 P. 461, 464 (1902)
(concurring opinion).
45 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
46 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
47 "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scru-
tinized." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1963) ; accord, Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
The right to vote is a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); accord, Otsuka v. Hite, 64
Cal. 2d 596, 601, 414 P.2d 412, 416 (1966).
48 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).
49 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
50 Id.
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of state standards which do not discriminate against candidates
and do not contravene restrictions imposed by Congress.5
In striking down the poll tax as a condition to voting in state
elections, the Supreme Court said in Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections:5 2
We conclude that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have
no relation to wealth nor to paying this or any other tax....
But we must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes
to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth like
race, creed, or color is not germane to one's ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process. 53
Since the right to candidacy is a necessary corollary of the right
to vote, it seems that the state violates the equal protection clause
when it imposes upon a candidate a standard of wealth in the guise
of a filing fee; a standard irrelevant to his intelligent participation
inthe electoral process.
Proponents of the filing fee have argued the same three ration-
ales that had sustained the life of the poll tax as a condition to the
exercise of the voting franchise.54 First, it was urged, the state may
exact fees from citizens for many different kinds of licenses. If it
could demand of a citizen a fee for a driver's license, it could de-
mand of its citizens a fee for a voting "license."55 This is the
"reimbursement for services" argument upon which Uhl relied asjustification for the imposition of the filing fee.5" The Supreme Court
dismissed this theory in Harper, stating that the interest of a state
with regard to voting is limited to fixing qualifications.57 Secondly,
it was said that payment of a poll tax before a citizen could vote
promoted civic responsibility and weeded out those who did not
51 Id. at 665 (by implication); see also Lassiter v. Northampton Ed. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
52 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
53 Id. at 668.54 Harper is the most recent case containing a searching discussion. For a sum-
miry of the earlier cases discussing the poll tax issue see Annot., 139 A.L.R. 562
(1942).
55 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
.56 See p. 169 supra. "The right to exact a reasonable fee for the privilege of run-
ning for office may be sustained, on the 1irinciple that fees in actions and proceedings
in courts, and for filing and recording papers, are sustainable." State ex rel. Zent v.
Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, -, 97 P. 728, 730 (1908).
57 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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care enough about public affairs to pay the tax. This is the regulation
argument that those who can bear the levy are more responsible,
more knowledgeable, more educated, and more worthy of confidence
than those without means.58 Although rational, and historically
documented, the regulation theory carried little weight with the
Court; '9 the degree of discrimination was and still remains irrelevant
when applying the equal protection clause." Neither is an adminis-
trative benefit to the state justified when it deprives a class of
individuals of the right to vote. 1
A third argument favoring the tax was that the weight of
precedent alone was enough to justify its approval; that the poll tax
was instituted for a rational purpose, its validity established, and
therefore, should not have been questioned. 2 In response the Su-
preme Court noted that the equal protection clause is not "shackled
to the political theory of a particular era." 63 Citing its historic
reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson,64 the Court stated that "[n]otions
of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause do change." '65
Although it is not clear that there is a right to candidacy, the
expanding interpretation of equal protection would seem to protect
the candidate as strongly as the voter when the state employs a
primary filing fee which is arbitrary or discriminatory.
THE FILING FEE AS ABRIDGEMENT OF THE VOTER'S RIGHT
If the effect of imposing a filing fee on a candidate seems ap-
parent, the incursion upon the voter's rights is less obvious. In
United States v. Classic6 the Court upheld the voter's right to
choose representatives for federal office in any election that deter-
mines the true weight a vote will have. Reynolds v. Sims6 7 requires
that in a state election each man's vote is to have the same weight
58 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 685 (1966) (dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan).
59 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
60 Id. at 685-86 & n.10 (dissenting opinion).
61 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (state could not deny the opportunity
to vote to a bona fide resident merely because he was a member of the armed services).
62 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (dissenting opinions
of Justices Black and Harlan).
63 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
64 163 U.S. 537 (1896), rev'd, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(repudiating the infamous "separate-but-equal" doctrine which had sustained racial
segregation in public schools).
65 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
66 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
67 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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as the other's in proportion to the entire electorate. By utilizing
contemporary fourteenth amendment interpretations Harper guar-
antees to state election voters the same protection guaranteed in
the twenty-fourth amendment 6 to federal election voters.
Despite these indicia of constitutional policy, the primary filing
fee endures even though it seems to tax the voter's rights. When
a candidate is prevented from participating in the primary by an
arbitrary standard of wealth, his constituency may no longer have
the opportunity to vote for a candidate sympathetic to its views.
Though the assessment is levied against the candidate, the effect on
the elective system is the same as if it were levied directly against
the voter, that is, his constitutionally protected right to choose"9 is
abridged.
That write-in votes are permitted in no way vitiates this argu-
ment. For a person nominated by having his name written on the
primary ballot must pay the same filing fee to attain the general
election ballot that would have been required if his primary declara-
tion had been filed.70
Funds provided by concerned citizens to pay a candidate's fee
are clearly distinguishable from monies contributed to the political
party for campaign and other expenses, since the fees go to the state
and county treasuries.7' Yet in this situation the constituent is called
upon to pay in order to exercise his right to freely choose. This
would seem to be a discriminatory paradox.
CONCLUSION
Although the state may impose reasonable regulations on the
conduct of a primary election, the rights of the citizen should be
protected against any conditions that are not relevant to intelligent
participation in the electoral process. The important interest of the
state in conducting orderly elections is not the determinative factor
even though the rights of only a few are infringed or denied. 72 The
rights of each and every citizen should be given equal protection.
Since the right to candidacy is a necessary corollary to the
voter's free choice, neither the candidate nor the voter should be
burdened with irrelevent and arbitrary regulations.
68 "The right of citizens . . . to vote in any primary or other election for . . .
[list of federal offices], shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax . . . ." U.S. Co NsT. amend. XXIV.
69 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).
70 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6555 (West 1961).
71 CAL. ELEC. CoDE § 6556 (West 1961).
72 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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Moreover, modern interpretation of the equal protection clause
indicates that wealth is not germane to one's ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process. The filing fee seems no more
relevant to the candidate's intelligent involvement than does the poll
tax to the voter's participation. Furthermore, to the extent an ef-
fective franchise right demands that citizens be able to place the
name of their candidate into the competition, a filing fee would tax
this right, albeit indirectly. The voter himself may have to satisfy
the required fee in order to see his nominee in the running.
While precedent suggests that candidacy is a so-called "priv-
ilege," it would seem that there is no room at the inn of American
democracy for property qualifications which conflict with the preva-
lent egalitarian requirements of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
James M. King
